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The Once and Future 
Superpower
Why China Won’t Overtake the United States
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth 
After two and a half decades, is the United States’ run as the world’s sole superpower coming to an end? Many say yes, seeing a rising China ready to catch up to or even surpass the 
United States in the near future. By many measures, after all, China’s 
economy is on track to become the world’s biggest, and even if its 
growth slows, it will still outpace that of the United States for many 
years. Its coffers overflowing, Beijing has used its new wealth to attract 
friends, deter enemies, modernize its military, and aggressively assert 
sovereignty claims in its periphery. For many, therefore, the question 
is not whether China will become a superpower but just how soon.
But this is wishful, or fearful, thinking. Economic growth no longer 
translates as directly into military power as it did in the past, which 
means that it is now harder than ever for rising powers to rise and 
established ones to fall. And China—the only country with the raw 
potential to become a true global peer of the United States—also faces 
a more daunting challenge than previous rising states because of how 
far it lags behind technologically. Even though the United States’ 
economic dominance has eroded from its peak, the country’s military 
superiority is not going anywhere, nor is the globe-spanning alliance 
structure that constitutes the core of the existing liberal international 
order (unless Washington unwisely decides to throw it away). Rather 
than expecting a power transition in international politics, everyone 
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should start getting used to a world in 
which the United States remains the 
sole superpower for 
decades to come. 
Lasting preeminence will 
help the United States ward off the 
greatest traditional international danger, 
war between the world’s major powers. And it 
will give Washington options for dealing with non-
state threats such as terrorism and transnational challenges 
such as climate change. But it will also impose burdens of 
leadership and force choices among competing priorities, 
particularly as finances grow more straitened. With great power 
comes great responsibility, as the saying goes, and playing its leading 
role successfully will require Washington to display a maturity that 
U.S. foreign policy has all too often lacked.
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
In forecasts of China’s future power position, much has been made of the 
country’s pressing domestic challenges: its slowing economy, polluted 
environment, widespread corruption, perilous financial markets, non-
existent social safety net, rapidly aging population, and restive middle 
class. But as harmful as these problems are, China’s true Achilles’ heel 
on the world stage is something else: its low level of technological 
expertise compared with the United States’. Relative to past rising 
powers, China has a much wider technological gap to close with the 
leading power. China may export container after container of high-
tech goods, but in a world of globalized production, that doesn’t reveal 
much. Half of all Chinese exports consist of what economists call 
“processing trade,” meaning that parts are imported into China for 
assembly and then exported afterward. And the vast majority of these 
Chinese exports are directed not by Chinese firms but by corporations 
from more developed countries.
When looking at measures of technological prowess that better 
reflect the national origin of the expertise, China’s true position 
becomes clear. World Bank data on payments for the use of intellectual 
property, for example, indicate that the United States is far and away 
the leading source of innovative technologies, boasting $128 billion in 
receipts in 2013—more than four times as much as the country in 
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second place, Japan. China, by contrast, imports technologies on a 
massive scale yet received less than $1 billion in receipts in 2013 for 
the use of its intellectual property. Another good indicator of the 
technological gap is the number of so-called triadic patents, those 
registered in the United States, Europe, and Japan. In 2012, nearly 
14,000 such patents originated in the United States, compared with 
just under 2,000 in China. The distribution of highly influential 
articles in science and engineering—those in the top one percent of 
citations, as measured by the National Science Foundation—tells the 
same story, with the United States accounting for almost half of these 
articles, more than eight times China’s share. So does the breakdown 
of Nobel Prizes in Physics, Chemistry, and Physiology or Medicine. 
Since 1990, 114 have gone to U.S.-based researchers. China-based 
researchers have received two.
Precisely because the Chinese economy is so unlike the U.S. econ-
omy, the measure fueling expectations of a power shift, gdp, greatly 
underestimates the true economic gap between the two countries. For 
one thing, the immense destruction that China is now wreaking on its 
environment counts favorably toward its gdp, even though it will reduce 
economic capacity over time by shortening life spans and raising 
cleanup and health-care costs. For another thing, 
gdp was originally designed to measure mid-
twentieth-century manufacturing economies, 
and so the more knowledge-based and global-
ized a country’s production is, the more its 
gdp underestimates its economy’s 
true size.
A new statistic developed by 
the un suggests the degree to 
which gdp inflates China’s rel-
ative power. Called “inclusive 
wealth,” this measure represents 
economists’ most systematic effort 
to date to calculate a state’s wealth. 
As a un report explained, it counts a 
country’s stock of assets in three areas: “(i) 
manufactured capital (roads, buildings, machines, 
and equipment), (ii) human capital (skills, education, 
health), and (iii) natural capital (sub-soil resources, 
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ecosystems, the atmosphere).” Added up, the United States’ inclusive 
wealth comes to almost $144 trillion—4.5 times China’s $32 trillion. 
The true size of China’s economy relative to the United States’ may 
lie somewhere in between the numbers provided by gdp and inclusive 
wealth, and admittedly, the latter measure has yet to receive the same 
level of scrutiny as gdp. The problem with gdp, however, is that it 
measures a flow (typically, the value of goods and services produced 
in a year), whereas inclusive wealth measures a stock. As The Economist 
put it, “Gauging an economy by its gdp is like judging a company by 
its quarterly profits, without ever peeking at its balance-sheet.” Because 
inclusive wealth measures the pool of resources a government can 
conceivably draw on to achieve its strategic objectives, it is the more 
useful metric when thinking about geopolitical competition. 
But no matter how one compares the size of the U.S. and Chinese 
economies, it is clear that the United States is far more capable of 
converting its resources into military might. In the past, rising states 
had levels of technological prowess similar to those of leading ones. 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, 
the United States didn’t lag far behind the United Kingdom in terms 
of technology, nor did Germany lag far behind the erstwhile Allies 
during the interwar years, nor was the Soviet Union backward techno-
logically compared with the United States during the early Cold War. 
This meant that when these challengers rose economically, they could 
soon mount a serious military challenge to the dominant power. 
China’s relative technological backwardness today, however, means 
that even if its economy continues to gain ground, it will not be easy 
for it to catch up militarily and become a true global strategic peer, as 
opposed to a merely a major player in its own neighborhood.
BARRIERS TO ENTRY
The technological and economic differences between China and the 
United States wouldn’t matter much if all it took to gain superpower 
status were the ability to use force locally. But what makes the United 
States a superpower is its ability to operate globally, and the bar for 
that capability is high. It means having what the political scientist Barry 
Posen has called “command of the commons”—that is, control over 
the air, space, and the open sea, along with the necessary infrastructure 
for managing these domains. When one measures the 14 categories 
of systems that create this capability (everything from nuclear attack 
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submarines to satellites to transport aircraft), what emerges is an 
overwhelming U.S. advantage in each area, the result of decades of 
advances on multiple fronts. It would take a very long time for China 
to approach U.S. power on any of these fronts, let alone all of them.
For one thing, the United States has built up a massive scientific 
and industrial base. China is rapidly enhancing its technological inputs, 
increasing its R & D spending and its 
numbers of graduates with degrees in 
science and engineering. But there are 
limits to how fast any country can leap 
forward in such matters, and there are 
various obstacles in China’s way—such 
as a lack of effective intellectual property protections and inefficient 
methods of allocating capital—that will be extremely hard to change 
given its rigid political system. Adding to the difficulty, China is chasing 
a moving target. In 2012, the United States spent $79 billion on military 
R & D, more than 13 times as much as China’s estimated amount, so 
even rapid Chinese advances might be insufficient to close the gap.
Then there are the decades the United States has spent procuring 
advanced weapons systems, which have grown only more complex 
over time. In the 1960s, aircraft took about five years to develop, but 
by the 1990s, as the number of parts and lines of code ballooned, the 
figure reached ten years. Today, it takes 15 to 20 years to design and 
build the most advanced fighter aircraft, and military satellites can 
take even longer. So even if another country managed to build the 
scientific and industrial base to develop the many types of weapons 
that give the United States command of the commons, there would 
be a lengthy lag before it could actually possess them. Even Chinese 
defense planners recognize the scale of the challenge.
Command of the commons also requires the ability to supervise a 
wide range of giant defense projects. For all the hullabaloo over the 
evils of the military-industrial complex and the “waste, fraud, and 
abuse” in the Pentagon, in the United States, research labs, contractors, 
and bureaucrats have painstakingly acquired this expertise over many 
decades, and their Chinese counterparts do not yet have it. This kind 
of “learning by doing” experience resides in organizations, not in 
individuals. It can be transferred only through demonstration and 
instruction, so cybertheft or other forms of espionage are not an 
effective shortcut for acquiring it.
A giant economy alone 
won’t make China the 
world’s second superpower.
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth
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China’s defense industry is still in its infancy, and as the scholar 
Richard Bitzinger and his colleagues have concluded, “Aside from a 
few pockets of excellence such as ballistic missiles, the Chinese military-
industrial complex has appeared to demonstrate few capacities for 
designing and producing relatively advanced conventional weapon sys-
tems.” For example, China still cannot mass-produce high-performance 
aircraft engines, despite the immense resources it has thrown at the 
effort, and relies instead on second-rate Russian models. In other 
areas, Beijing has not even bothered competing. Take undersea 
warfare. China is poorly equipped for antisubmarine warfare and is 
doing very little to improve. And only now is the country capable of 
producing nuclear-powered attack submarines that are comparable in 
quietness to the kinds that the U.S. Navy commissioned in the 1950s. 
Since then, however, the U.S. government has invested hundreds 
of billions of dollars and six decades of effort in its current generation 
of Virginia-class submarines, which have achieved absolute levels 
of silencing. 
Finally, it takes a very particular set of skills and infrastructure to 
actually use all these weapons. Employing them is difficult not just 
because the weapons themselves tend to be so complex but also be-
cause they typically need to be used in a coordinated manner. It is an 
incredibly complicated endeavor, for example, to deploy a carrier bat-
tle group; the many associated ships and aircraft must work together 
in real time. Even systems that may seem simple require a complex 
surrounding architecture in order to be truly effective. Drones, for 
example, work best when a military has the highly trained personnel 
to operate them and the technological and organizational capacity to 
rapidly gather, process, and act on information collected from them. 
Developing the necessary infrastructure to seek command of the 
commons would take any military a very long time. And since the task 
places a high premium on flexibility and delegation, China’s cen-
tralized and hierarchical forces are particularly ill suited for it. 
THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT
In the 1930s alone, Japan escaped the depths of depression and 
morphed into a rampaging military machine, Germany transformed 
from the disarmed loser of World War I into a juggernaut capable of 
conquering Europe, and the Soviet Union recovered from war and 
revolution to become a formidable land power. The next decade saw 
The Once and Future Superpower
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the United States’ own sprint from military also-ran to global super-
power, with a nuclear Soviet Union close on its heels. Today, few 
seriously anticipate another world war, or even another cold war, but 
many observers argue that these past experiences reveal just how quickly 
countries can become dangerous once they try to extract military capa-
bilities from their economies.
But what is taking place now is not your grandfather’s power transi-
tion. One can debate whether China will soon reach the first major 
milestone on the journey from great power to superpower: having the 
requisite economic resources. But a giant 
economy alone won’t make China the 
world’s second superpower, nor would 
overcoming the next big hurdle, attain-
ing the requisite technological capacity. 
After that lies the challenge of transforming all this latent power into 
the full range of systems needed for global power projection and 
learning how to use them. Each of these steps is time consuming and 
fraught with difficulty. As a result, China will, for a long time, continue 
to hover somewhere between a great power and a superpower. You might 
call it “an emerging potential superpower”: thanks to its economic 
growth, China has broken free from the great-power pack, but it still has 
a long way to go before it might gain the economic and technological 
capacity to become a superpower.
China’s quest for superpower status is undermined by something 
else, too: weak incentives to make the sacrifices required. The United 
States owes its far-reaching military capabilities to the existential 
imperatives of the Cold War. The country would never have borne the 
burden it did had policymakers not faced the challenge of balancing 
the Soviet Union, a superpower with the potential to dominate 
Eurasia. (Indeed, it is no surprise that two and a half decades after the 
Soviet Union collapsed, it is Russia that possesses the second-greatest 
military capability in the world.) Today, China faces nothing like the 
Cold War pressures that led the United States to invest so much in its 
military. The United States is a far less threatening superpower than 
the Soviet Union was: however aggravating Chinese policymakers 
find U.S. foreign policy, it is unlikely to engender the level of fear 
that motivated Washington during the Cold War.
Stacking the odds against China even more, the United States has 
few incentives to give up power, thanks to the web of alliances it 
This is not your grandfather’s 
power transition. 
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth
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has long boasted. A list of U.S. allies reads as a who’s who of the 
world’s most advanced economies, and these partners have lowered 
the price of maintaining the United States’ superpower status. U.S. 
defense spending stood at around three percent of gdp at the end of 
the 1990s, rose to around five percent in the next decade on account 
of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and has now fallen back to close 
to three percent. Washington has been able to sustain a global mili-
tary capacity with relatively little effort thanks in part to the bases 
its allies host and the top-end weapons they help develop. China’s 
only steadfast ally is North Korea, which is often more trouble than 
it is worth. 
Given the barriers thwarting China’s path to superpower status, 
as well as the low incentives for trying to overcome them, the future 
of the international system hinges most on whether the United 
States continues to bear the much 
lower burden of sustaining what we 
and others have called “deep engage-
ment,” the globe-girdling grand strat-
egy it has followed for some 70 years. 
And barring some odd change of heart 
that results in a true abnegation of its 
global role (as opposed to overwrought, 
politicized charges sometimes made 
about its already having done so), 
Washington will be well positioned for decades to maintain the core 
military capabilities, alliances, and commitments that secure key 
regions, backstop the global economy, and foster cooperation on trans-
national problems.
The benefits of this grand strategy can be difficult to discern, especially 
in light of the United States’ foreign misadventures in recent years. 
Fiascos such as the invasion of Iraq stand as stark reminders of the 
difficulty of using force to alter domestic politics abroad. But power is 
as much about preventing unfavorable outcomes as it is about causing 
favorable ones, and here Washington has done a much better job than 
most Americans appreciate. 
For a largely satisfied power leading the international system, having 
enough strength to deter or block challengers is in fact more valuable 
than having the ability to improve one’s position further on the margins. 
A crucial objective of U.S. grand strategy over the decades has been 
A world of lasting U.S. 
military preeminence and 
declining U.S. economic 
dominance will test the 
United States’ capacity  
for restraint.
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to prevent a much more dangerous world from emerging, and its success 
in this endeavor can be measured largely by the absence of outcomes 
common to history: important regions destabilized by severe security 
dilemmas, tattered alliances unable to contain breakout challengers, 
rapid weapons proliferation, great-power arms races, and a descent 
into competitive economic or military blocs. 
Were Washington to truly pull back from the world, more of these 
challenges would emerge, and transnational threats would likely loom 
even larger than they do today. Even if such threats did not grow, the 
task of addressing them would become immeasurably harder if the 
United States had to grapple with a much less stable global order at 
the same time. And as difficult as it sometimes is today for the United 
States to pull together coalitions to address transnational challenges, 
it would be even harder to do so if the country abdicated its leader-
ship role and retreated to tend its garden, as a growing number of 
analysts and policymakers—and a large swath of the public—are now 
calling for. 
LEAD US NOT INTO TEMPTATION
Ever since the Soviet Union’s demise, the United States’ dramatic 
power advantage over other states has been accompanied by the risk 
of self-inflicted wounds, as occurred in Iraq. But the slippage in the 
United States’ economic position may have the beneficial effect of 
forcing U.S. leaders to focus more on the core mission of the coun-
try’s grand strategy rather than being sucked into messy peripheral 
conflicts. Indeed, that has been the guiding logic behind President 
Barack Obama’s foreign policy. Nonetheless, a world of lasting U.S. 
military preeminence and declining U.S. economic dominance will 
continue to test the United States’ capacity for restraint, in four 
main ways.
First is the temptation to bully or exploit American allies in the 
pursuit of self-interested gain. U.S. allies are dependent on Washington 
in many ways, and leaning on them to provide favors in return—
whether approving of controversial U.S. policies, refraining from 
activities the United States opposes, or agreeing to lopsided terms in 
mutually beneficial deals—seems like something only a chump would 
forgo. (Think of the Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump’s 
frequent claims that the United States always loses in its dealings 
with foreigners, including crucial allies, and that he would restore the 
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country’s ability to win.) But the basic contract at the heart of the 
contemporary international order is that if its members put aside the 
quest for relative military advantage, join a dense web of institutional 
networks, and agree to play by common rules, then the United States 
will not take advantage of its dominance to extract undue returns 
from its allies. It would be asking too much to expect Washington 
to never use its leverage to seek better deals, and a wide range of 
presidents—including John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George 
W. Bush, and Obama—have done so at various times. But if 
Washington too often uses its power to achieve narrowly self-
interested gains, rather than to protect and advance the system as 
a whole, it will run a real risk of eroding the legitimacy of both its 
leadership and the existing order. 
Second, the United States will be increasingly tempted to overreact 
when other states—namely, China—use their growing economic 
clout on the world stage. Most of the recent rising powers of note, 
including Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union, were stronger 
militarily than economically. China, by contrast, will for decades 
be stronger economically than militarily. This is a good thing, since 
military challenges to global order can turn ugly quickly. But it 
means that China will mount economic challenges instead, and 
these will need to be handled wisely. Most of China’s efforts along 
these lines will likely involve only minor or cosmetic alterations to 
the existing order, important for burnishing Beijing’s prestige but 
not threatening to the order’s basic arrangements or principles. 
Washington should respond to these gracefully and with forbear-
ance, recognizing that paying a modest price for including Beijing 
within the order is preferable to risking provoking a more fundamental 
challenge to the structure in general.
The recent fracas over the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is 
a good example of how not to behave. China proposed the aiib in 
2013 as a means to bolster its status and provide investment in infra-
structure in Asia. Although its criteria for loans might turn out to be 
less constructive than desired, it is not likely to do major harm to the 
region or undermine the structure of the global economy. And yet the 
United States responded by launching a public diplomatic campaign 
to dissuade its allies from joining. They balked at U.S. opposition and 
signed up eagerly. By its reflexive opposition both to a relatively 
constructive Chinese initiative and to its allies’ participation in it, 
The Once and Future Superpower
 May/June 2016 101
Washington created an unnecessary zero-sum battle that ended in a 
humiliating diplomatic defeat. (A failure by the U.S. Congress to pass 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership as negotiated, meanwhile, would be an 
even greater fiasco, leading to serious questions abroad about U.S. 
global leadership.)
Third, the United States will still face the temptation that always 
accompanies power, to intervene in places where its core national 
interests are not in play (or to expand the definition of its core national 
interests so much as to hollow out the concept). That temptation can 
exist in the midst of a superpower struggle—the United States got 
bogged down in Vietnam during the Cold War, as did the Soviet 
Union in Afghanistan—and it clearly exists today, at a time when the 
United States has no peer rivals. Obama has carefully guarded against 
this temptation. He attracted much criticism for elevating “Don’t do 
stupid stuff” to a grand-strategic maxim. But if doing stupid stuff 
threatens the United States’ ability to sustain its grand strategy and 
associated global presence, then he had a point. Missing, though, was 
a corollary: “Keep your eye on the ball.” And for nearly seven decades, 
that has meant continuing Washington’s core mission of fostering 
stability in key regions and keeping the global economy and wider 
order humming.
Finally, Washington will need to avoid adopting overly aggressive 
military postures even when core interests are at stake, such as with 
China’s increasingly assertive stance in its periphery. It is true that 
Beijing’s “anti-access/area-denial” capabilities have greatly raised the 
costs and risks of operating U.S. aircraft and surface ships (but 
not submarines) near China. How Washington should respond to 
Beijing’s newfound local military capability, however, depends on 
what Washington’s strategic goals are. To regain all the military free-
dom of action the United States enjoyed during its extraordinary 
dominance throughout the 1990s would indeed be difficult, and the 
actions necessary would increase the risk of future confrontations. Yet 
if Washington’s goals are more limited—securing regional allies and 
sustaining a favorable institutional and economic order—then the 
challenge should be manageable.
By adopting its own area-denial strategy, for example, the United 
States could still deter Chinese aggression and protect U.S. allies 
despite China’s rising military power. Unlike the much-discussed 
Air-Sea Battle doctrine for a Pacific conflict, this approach would not 
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envision hostilities rapidly escalating to strikes on the Chinese main-
land. Rather, it would be designed to curtail China’s ability during 
a conflict to operate within what is 
commonly known as “the first island 
chain,” encompassing parts of Japan, 
the Philippines, and Taiwan. Under 
this strategy, the United States and 
its allies would employ the same mix 
of capabilities—such as mines and 
mobile antiship missiles—that China 
itself has used to push U.S. surface 
ships and aircraft away from its coast. And it could turn the tables 
and force China to compete in areas where it remains very weak, 
most notably, undersea warfare.
The premise of such a strategy is that even if China were able to 
deny U.S. surface forces and aircraft access to the area near its coast, 
it would not be able to use that space as a launching pad for project-
ing military power farther during a conflict. China’s coastal waters, 
in this scenario, would turn into a sort of no man’s sea, in which nei-
ther state could make much use of surface ships or aircraft. This 
would be a far cry from the situation that prevailed during the 1990s, 
when China could not stop the world’s leading military power from 
enjoying unfettered access to its airspace and ocean right up to its 
territorial border. But the change needs to be put in perspective: it 
is only natural that after spending tens of billions of dollars over 
decades, China has begun to reverse this unusual vulnerability, one 
the United States would never accept for itself.
While this area-denial strategy would help solve a long-term prob-
lem, it would do little to address the most immediate challenge from 
China: the military facilities it is steadily building on artificial islands 
in the South China Sea. There is no easy answer, but Washington 
should avoid too aggressive a reaction, which could spark a conflict. 
After all, these small, exposed islands arguably leave the overall 
military balance unchanged, since they would be all but impossible 
to defend in a conflict. China’s assertiveness may even be backfiring. 
Last year, the Philippines—real islands with extremely valuable 
basing facilities—welcomed U.S. forces back onto its shores after a 
24-year absence. And the United States is now in talks to base long-
range bombers in Australia.
By adopting its own area-
denial strategy, the United 
States could still deter 
Chinese aggression and 
protect U.S. allies.
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To date, the Obama administration has chosen to conduct so-called 
freedom-of-navigation operations in order to contest China’s mar-
itime claims. But as the leader of the order it largely shaped, the 
United States has many other arrows in its quiver. To place the burden 
of escalation on China, the United States—or, even better, its allies—
could take a page from China’s playbook and ramp up quasi-official 
research voyages in the area. Another asset Washington has is inter-
national law. Pressure is mounting on China to submit its territorial 
disputes to arbitration in international courts, and if Beijing continues 
to resist doing so, it will lose legitimacy and could find itself a target 
of sanctions and other diplomatic punishments. And if Beijing tried 
to extract economic gains from contested regions, Washington could 
facilitate a process along the lines of the proportional punishment 
strategy it helped make part of the World Trade Organization: let the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, in The Hague, determine the gains 
of China’s illegal actions, place a temporary tariff on Chinese exports 
to collect exactly that much revenue while the sovereignty claims are 
being adjudicated, and then distribute them once the matter is settled 
before the International Court of Justice. Whatever approach is adopted, 
what matters for U.S. global interests is not the islands themselves 
or the nature of the claims per se but what these provocations do to 
the wider order.
Although China can “pose problems without catching up,” in the 
words of the political scientist Thomas Christensen, the bottom line 
is that the United States’ global position gives it room to maneuver. 
The key is to exploit the advantages of standing on the defensive: as 
a raft of strategic thinkers have pointed out, challenging a settled status 
quo is very hard to do.
KNOW THYSELF
Despite China’s ascent, the United States’ superpower position is 
more secure than recent commentary would have one believe—so 
secure, in fact, that the chief threat to the world’s preeminent power 
arguably lies within. As U.S. dominance ebbs slightly from its peak 
two decades ago, Washington may be tempted to overreact to the set-
backs inherent in an admittedly frustrating and hard-to-manage world 
by either lashing out or coming home—either way abandoning the 
patient and constructive approach that has been the core of its grand 
strategy for many decades. This would be a grave mistake. That 
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grand strategy has been far more successful and beneficial than most 
people realize, since they take for granted its chief accomplishment—
preventing the emergence of a much less congenial world.
One sure way to generate a wrong-headed push for retrench-
ment would be to undertake another misadventure like the war in 
Iraq. That America has so far weathered that disaster with its global 
position intact is a testament to just how robust its superpower 
status is. But that does not mean that policymakers can make per-
petual blunders with impunity. In a world in which the United 
States retains its overwhelming military preeminence as its eco-
nomic dominance slips, the temptation to overreact to perceived 
threats will grow—even as the margin of error for absorbing the 
costs of the resulting mistakes will shrink. Despite what is being 
said on the campaign trail these days, the United States is hardly in 
an unusually perilous global situation. But nor is its standing so 
secure that irresponsible policies by the next president won’t take 
their toll.∂
